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THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: A ‘NOMAN’S LAND’ FOR UNITED STATES PATENT
LAW
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ABSTRACT
The judiciary has traditionally deferred to Congress’s law-making
powers by invoking a strict presumption against applying United States law
abroad. In WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., the court held
that a plaintiff could not claim direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) because the defendant’s activities—occurring in the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone—did not occur “within the United States.” This
decision was significant because the United States possesses a bundle of
rights in its Exclusive Economic Zone which approaches, but stops short
of, full sovereignty. The United States has an economic interest in
developing the natural resources that lie within its Exclusive Economic
Zone, so expanding the scope of United States patent law to the Exclusive
Economic Zone will spur that development. Other courts will likely
conclude that the United States Exclusive Economic Zone is not “within
the United States” for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) by invoking the
strict presumption against extraterritorial application. As a result, Congress
should take notice of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)’s deficient scope and enact a
direct infringement cause of action for infringing activity in the United
States Exclusive Economic Zone.

INTRODUCTION
A patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from
“making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States.”1 The
inventor’s exclusionary period lasts for twenty years from the filing date of
the patent application.2 United States patent law attempts to incentivize
*
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1.

DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 3 (3d ed. 2004)
(discussing the underlying principles of the United States patent regime) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 154).

2.

Id. (noting that in return for the exclusionary right, an inventor must describe his
invention in sufficient detail so as to give the public notice and enable a person
“of ordinary skill in the art . . . to make and use the invention); see also
ALEXANDER I. POLTORAK & PAUL J. LERNER, ESSENTIALS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 3 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that owners of design patents enjoy an
exclusionary term of fourteen years from the date of a patent’s issuance).
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invention, research and development, disclosure, commercialization of the
patented devices, and designs for substitutable alternatives to patented
devices.3 Some researchers have concluded that intellectual property law is
a vehicle that spurs innovation and economic growth.4 This Note posits that
Congressional silence on 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (hereinafter “§ 271(a)”)
forecloses some patent infringement claims in the United States Exclusive
Economic Zone (hereinafter “EEZ”), preventing inventors and businesses
from obtaining the benefits of patent protection. This Note weighs the
benefits of applying the U.S. patent regime to the EEZ against the
detriments associated with extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
To the extent that there is ambiguity associated with patent
enforcement in the EEZ, there is significant pressure for the courts to reach
‘correct’ results regarding infringement; in situations where the state of the
law is in flux, the parties to a lawsuit may settle instead of subjecting
themselves to an indeterminate outcome in the court system.5 The
possibility of costly litigation might disincentive research and development
projects related to the EEZ. The desirability of an efficient U.S. patent
regime is clear as inefficiencies, including those caused by the ambiguous
state of patent law application to the EEZ, discourage innovation.
Section I of this Note will describe the United States’ limited, but
substantial sovereign rights in its EEZ. Section II will introduce the history
of extraterritorial application of United States law, focusing on the
extraterritorial application of patent law. Section III will attempt to
determine the most efficient composition of the U.S. patent regime,
including whether the regime should provide infringement liability for
intra-EEZ activities. The answer must strike a proper balance between
incentivizing innovation and promoting the public good—a fundamental
issue for patent law policy makers.6 Section IV sets out to establish which
government branch is best equipped to make changes to the United States
patent regime. Should Congress amend the United States Code to
accommodate the special characteristics of the EEZ, or should the judiciary
affect a change from the bench?
Section V will conclude that Congress should make an authoritative
statement regarding whether the EEZ is ‘within the United States,’ thus
allowing businesses, inventors, and potential infringers to accurately weigh
the risks of engaging in intra-EEZ activity. Congressional silence on this
issue has promulgated uncertainty, and to date only one federal district

3.

Id. at 66-71 (noting that the current patent regime might incentivize duplicative
invention, and the twenty year exclusionary period might not provide a sufficient
stimulus to invent).

4.

Id. at 55 (noting that economic research has shown a “causal link between
intellectual property and the growth of our national economy.”).

5.

Id. at 56.

6.

Id.
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court has addressed the matter.7 This inaction could result in an abundance
of litigation and transaction costs for parties engaging in intra-EEZ
activities. Congress, not the judiciary, is the proper entity to resolve this
issue primarily because the judiciary has historically deferred to Congress
in deciding extraterritorial application issues.

I. THE UNITED STATES’ SOVEREIGN RIGHTS IN ITS EEZ
A.

United States Patent Law & Territorialism

Territorialism is a pervasive theme in not only patent law, but also in
United States law as a whole.8 Globalization has put significant pressure on
the territorial limits of intellectual property laws.9 The traditional rule in the
United States is that local intellectual property laws should be applied to
infringing acts occurring within the territorial limits of the United States.10
The rise of the Internet in an increasingly inter-connected global
economy has applied significant pressure to United States copyright and
trademark regimes by facilitating the movement of copyrighted and
trademarked materials across national boundaries.11 In the realm of
intellectual property law, courts have treated copyright and trademark law
differently than patent law.12 Traditionally, patent law was the most
territorially based form of intellectual property due to the usually tangible
nature of patented goods and the review process of prospective patents by a
national agency.13 Nevertheless, the patent law regime has been tested by
the expansion of patentable subject matter to intangible inventions,
including business methods and software.14 Many patented inventions now
7.

See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 869 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone is not “within
the United States.”).

8.

Katherine E. White, The Recent Expansion of Territoriality in Patent
Infringement Cases, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2007) (“[T]he fundamental and
traditional principle of territoriality recently has been expanding to find patent
infringement for activity occurring entirely outside of the United States.”).

9.

Id. at 1 (stating that the “rapid pace of globalization has intensified the desire to
expand the territorial reach of United States law to determine patent
infringement.”).

10.

See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2119, 2127 (2008) (arguing that courts should enforce U.S. patents
extraterritorially, but only after considering foreign nations’ interests).

11.

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 479 (2000) (arguing that the
copyright regime must adapt to technological progress).

12.

See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2124.

13.

Id. (noting that many commentators have recognized the erosion of territorial
limits in patent law, but that none have offered a viable approach to this
development).

14.

Id.; see also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group., Inc. 149 F.3d
1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (allowing patent protection for business methods);
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have expanded development across national borders, creating difficulties
for patent holders and prospective inventors seeking protection against
infringement.15
The United States Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have
expanded the U.S. patent regime’s reach beyond its solely territory-based
application.16 The Federal Circuit determined that patent law applied
extraterritorially when the components of a system are physically located in
multiple nations and “the nature of a system’s components permits their
use to be separated from their physical location, such that the system may
not be located wholly within one jurisdiction.”17 In another case, instead of
focusing on the ‘physical location’ of the patented system as a dispositive
factor, the Supreme Court focused on where the patented system was
controlled and used.18 Courts have also looked at the type of patent
claim—whether covering devices and systems as opposed to processes or
methods—as a factor in deciding extraterritorial application issues.19 One
Federal Circuit decision focused on the specific subject matter of the patent
claim, granting special treatment with regards to extraterritorial application
because the patent covered software.20
but see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that a patent
claim for a method of hedging risk in commodities trading failed to meet the
machine-or-transformation test set forth by the Supreme Court).
15.

See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2125 (arguing that the courts have failed to
articulate a persuasive jurisprudence in response to the patent claims that have
effects across multiple national jurisdictions).

16.

Id. at 2127 (stating that “In some cases, the courts have been willing to step up
and extend the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents in ways that are shockingly
different from the reticence expressed in the past.”).

17.

See White, supra note 8, at 2-3 (noting that “[C]ourts have found patent claims on
processes require under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), all steps of the process occur within
the United States for patent infringement to arise. If, however, the claims are
drawn to a device, where only one part of the system takes place outside of the
United States for patent infringement to arise. If, however, the claims are drawn
to a device, where only one part of the system takes place outside the United
States, extraterritorial application of the patent law of the United States is
appropriate.”); see also NTP Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding infringement of inventions with multiple
components or multiple steps used in separate physical locations).

18.

Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (stating that the
patented system was infringed in the United States, where it was controlled).

19.

See White, supra note 8, at 3 (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in
AT&T v. Microsoft Corp., which held that copying of software in a foreign
country was infringement under U.S. patent law, was the farthest extension of
extraterritorial application to date); see also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (differentiating infringement for a
claimed device or system versus a process).

20.

AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating
that “[s]ection 271(f), if it is to remain effective, must therefore be interpreted in a
manner that is appropriate to the nature of the technology at issue.”).
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Congress has traditionally controlled the United States patent regime
approach to territorial issues by passing amendments to the Patent Act in
response to perceived flaws in the regime.21 Commentators, however, have
noted that on certain occasions, Congress has not reacted swiftly, or at all,
to flaws in the patent regime.22 Under such circumstances, courts have
opportunities to extend patent law extraterritorially, but overall they have
failed to develop a sound approach to the extraterritorial application of the
Patent Act.23 This Note posits that the potential benefits of applying U.S.
patent law to the EEZ and the unique characteristics of sovereignty in the
EEZ warrant a Congressional amendment.

B.

What is the EEZ? The Sliding Scale of Sovereignty in the Ocean
and Seabed

Formulating a coherent approach to application of United States patent
law within the U.S. EEZ requires an understanding of the areas that can be
viewed as subdivisions of the EEZ under customary international law.
These subdivisions, stated in order from the closest to the coastline to the
farthest from the coastline, include: the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the EEZ, and the ‘Area.’24 These subdivisions are delineated in the Third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
“UNCLOS”).25 The United States is not a party to UNCLOS,26 but the
legislative history of the treaty demonstrates that the United States was a
major player in the treaty negotiations and the treaty’s final form. The
Deep Seabed Mining Regime envisioned by UNCLOS Article XI has
prevented the United States Senate from ratifying the treaty.27 Although the
21.

See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2127 (describing a separation of powers in which
“[t]he courts would strictly construe the territorial limits of U.S. patent rights, and
Congress would amend the Patent Act to deal with these perceived loopholes.”).

22.

Id. at 2127 (noting that “the current state of the law is unclear and lacks a firm
theoretical foundation.”).

23.

See id. (noting that many decisions applying patent law extraterritorially have
been aimed at eradicating attempts to ‘game the system’ by exploiting flaws in
the jurisprudence).

24.

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter ‘UNCLOS’] (defining the territorial sea); UNCLOS,
art. 33 (defining the contiguous zone and a coastal nation’s rights in that zone);
UNCLOS, arts. 55-75 (defining the Exclusive Economic Zone and a coastal
nation’s rights in that zone); UNCLOS, arts. 133-91 (defining the Area and
describing a coastal nation’s rights in that zone).

25.

See generally UNCLOS (establishing a comprehensive codification of
international customary law for activity on and in the world’s seas).

26.

See generally David J. Bederman, The Old Isolationism and the New Law of the
Sea: Reflections on Advice and Consent for UNCLOS, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 21
(2008) (discussing the barriers to United States ratification of UNCLOS and
arguing for that ratification would increase international cooperation and enhance
United States interests).

27.

Id. at 24-25 (“Although the original UNCLOS was rightly rejected because of its
absurdly drafted provisions on the mining of manganese nodules, including the
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treaty’s provisions are not binding on the United States,28 the noncontroversial aspects of the treaty, including those delineating the territorial
sea, contiguous zone, and the EEZ are useful for determining the degree of
sovereignty that the United States exerts over its EEZ. Scholars assert that
UNCLOS has codified a large body of customary international law29
because 166 nations and the European Union are parties to the treaty. Such
overwhelming participation in an international treaty places normative
pressure on non-signatory nations like the United States.30
Traditionally, the extent of a nation’s sovereignty over resources in an
ocean was limited to a small area of an ocean adjacent to that nation’s
coast,31 referred to as the “territorial sea.”32 The width of the territorial sea
has fluctuated throughout history, but by the 1970s, most states accepted
twelve nautical miles or less as the maximum scope of the territorial sea.33

creation of an international mining consortium known grandiloquently as ‘The
Enterprise,’ UNCLOS has relatively fewer provisions on such ocean resource
activities such as lifting oil and gas reserves beyond 200 nautical miles, mining
polymetallic sulfides and other exotic substances found at mid-ocean ridges, bioprospecting the unique flora and fauna of the ocean abyss, and salvaging historic
shipwrecks.”).
28.

John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back
from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (“The
U.S., however, has not signed the Convention, nor has it acceded to it, so it is not
a state party. It is, therefore, not bound by the terms of the Convention and it may
not participate, absent some special arrangement, in the ongoing work of the
Convention-related bodies.”).

29.

Rachael E. Salcido, Section III.D: Air and Maritime Law: Law Applicable on the
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 58 AM J. COMP. L. 407,
407 (2010) (“[W]hile potential divergences between UNCLOS and customary
international law remain to be established, it is important to note that many U.S.
efforts at development and stewardship reflect the approaches set forth in
UNCLOS.”).

30.

UNITED NATIONS: DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the
Convention and the related Agreements as at October 29, 2013,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.h
tm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).

31.

UNITED NATIONS, The Law of the Sea: Conservation and Utilization of the Living
Resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Legislative History of Articles 61 and
62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1, 2 (1995) (“Under
traditional international law it was well established that the coastal State exercised
its sovereignty over the narrow belt—generally three miles wide—of the
territorial sea.”).

32.

Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988) (defining the territorial
sea).

33.

Lewis M. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561, 564 (1983) (assessing the viability of various
maritime regimes in light of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea).

56

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014
The Exclusive Economic Zone
Within the territorial sea, a nation has full sovereign rights, including
the ability to regulate domestic and foreign fishing, commerce, and
navigation.34 UNCLOS provides foreign vessels the right of “innocent
passage” in the territorial sea, allowing a foreign vessel to pass through a
coastal nation’s territorial sea “continuous[ly] and expeditious[ly].”35 This
provision is significant because it allows for slight intrusions into a coastal
nation’s sovereignty. To satisfy the “innocent passage” requirement,
however, a foreign vessel may not make any threat or use of force against
the sovereignty of the coastal nation.36
In the contiguous zone, the next subdivision of the EEZ, a coastal
nation has a less substantial package of sovereign rights than in its
territorial sea, and a more substantial package of rights than it has in its
EEZ.37 A contiguous zone is the territory extending outward from a
nation’s coastal baselines to a distance of twenty-four nautical miles.38 The
portion of the contiguous zone that does not overlap with the territorial sea
is the area between twelve nautical miles and twenty-four nautical miles
from the coastal baselines of the coastal nation.39 In the contiguous zone,
the coastal state nation can apply its laws to foreign vessels, but the coastal
nation’s power to do so is restricted to circumstances when a vessel
34.

Douglas W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential
Proclamation to Extend the Territorial Sea, 1 TERR. SEA J. 1, 3-4 (1990) (“A
nation is a sovereign in its territorial sea. Indeed, a nation has the same
sovereignty over the territorial sea as it has over its land territory.”).

35.

UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 17 (defining on innocent passage).

36.

Id. (“A foreign vessel may violate this provision if it: “perform[s] weapons
exercises or use weapons, sp[ies] on the coastal nation, perform[s] an act of
propaganda against the coastal nation, launch[es] or take[s] on board any aircraft,
load[s] or unload[s] commodities, currencies or persons contrary to the customs,
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws of the coastal nation, research[es], pollute[s],
fish[es], or interfere[s] with communications systems located in the coastal
nation.”).

37.

Compare UNCLOS, supra note 24, arts. 17-32 (codifying the right of innocent
passage through a coastal nation’s territorial sea, describing a coastal nation’s
right to limit innocent passage, and outlining rules for a coastal nation’s exercise
of criminal and civil jurisdiction over foreign ships passing through that nation’s
territorial sea) with UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 33 (granting a coastal nation the
right use its contiguous zone to “prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial
sea.”). For example, if a foreign ship violates a coastal nation’s immigration law
in the coastal nation’s territorial sea, and then travels outside of the coastal
nation’s territorial sea, then the coastal nation may detain that ship while it is
located in the contiguous zone.

38.

UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 33 (delineating the scope of the territorial sea).

39.

Compare UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 3 (“Every State has the right to establish
the breadth of the territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 miles, measured
from the baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”) with
UNCLOS III, supra note 24, art. 33 (“The continuous zone may not extend
beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.”).
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violates the coastal nation’s law while within the coastal nation’s territorial
sea.40 Article 33 of UNCLOS allows a nation to “exercise the control
necessary” to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws within the contiguous zone.41
UNCLOS defines the EEZ as “an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea,” creating a divide between the rights of a coastal nation in its
territorial sea and its EEZ.42 This definition stipulates that all of the rights
afforded to a nation in its EEZ are also available in that nation’s contiguous
zone (the area between twelve and twenty-four nautical miles from the
nation’s coastal baselines). Although the United States has not ratified
UNCLOS, other sources demonstrate the United States’ approach to
sovereignty in its EEZ. On September 28, 1945, President Truman issued a
proclamation asserting United States “jurisdiction [and control] over the
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf by . . .
contiguous nation[s].”43 This proclamation recognized United States and
other coastal nations’ sovereignty over the resources of their respective
continental shelves.44 Truman justified this assertion of sovereignty by
stating that “the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the
land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it” and
“[natural] resources frequently form a seaward extension of a pool or
deposit lying with the territory.”45
On March 10, 1983, President Reagan issued a proclamation
establishing an “Exclusive Economic Zone,” extending 200 nautical miles
from the baseline of the territorial sea.46 Reagan justified the United States’
assertion of sovereignty over the EEZ by appealing to other nations’
behaviors. He stated that in “the Exclusive Economic Zone, a coastal
[nation] may assert certain sovereign rights over natural resources and

40.

UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 33 (“In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea,
described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to . . . punish infringement of the above laws and regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea.”).

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at art. 55 (codifying coastal nations’ rights in their respective EEZs, and
extending those rights through coastal nations’ contiguous zones).

43.

Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 40 (Sept. 28, 1945); UNCLOS, supra note
24, art. 76 (“[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance.”).

44.

Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 40 (Sept. 28, 1945).

45.

Id.

46.

Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 50, 10605 (1983) (confirming the United
States’ sovereign rights in its EEZ).
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47
related jurisdiction.” The Proclamation represented an awareness of
customary international law, claiming United States sovereignty “to the
extent permitted by international law.”48

C.

What is at Stake in the EEZ?

The total area encompassed by the EEZ is nearly twice the size of the
continental United States.49 The United States’ interest in its EEZ is
significant because it has the largest EEZ of any nation, containing
valuable natural resources.50 The United States has demonstrated its
interest by initiating studies of prospective resource development in the
EEZ.51 The expansion of development in the EEZ will require the use of
patented technologies and will likely result in a proliferation of patent
infringement claims. How will courts address these claims, given the
judiciary’s traditional presumption against extraterritorial application of
patent law? A review of the relevant literature yields only one case that
discusses the application of the Patent Act to activities in the EEZ, leaving
the issue far from settled in the federal court system.52

47.

Id. (noting that the United States “desires to facilitate the wise development and
use of the oceans consistent with international law.”).

48.

See id. (claiming U.S. sovereignty in its EEZ for the purpose of exploring,
exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources, both living and
nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil and the super-adjacent waters).

49.

See Salcido, supra note 29, at 408 (arguing that the United States has failed to
articulate a comprehensive legislative approach to balance economic development
and conservation in the EEZ).

50.

Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive
Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility
of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 (2009) (estimating
that the U.S. EEZ covers 4.4 million square miles).

51.

See Salcido, supra note 29, at 408 (“[A]lthough the United States has recognized
the opportunities afforded by exercising its rights in the EEZ, to the extent
recognized by international law, its efforts to develop a cohesive body of law
applicable on the OCS and in the EEZ is currently in a state of flux.”).

52.

See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (“At issue in this case is marine seismic streamer technology
that is deployed behind ships. These streamers, essentially long cables, use
acoustic signals and sensors to create three-dimensional maps of the subsurface of
the ocean floor in order to facilitate natural resource exploration and
management. For many seismic studies, greater control over the depth and lateral
position of streamers is important in order to achieve optimal imagery from the
signals and to maneuver around impediments such as rocks and oil rigs.”).
WesternGeco alleged that the defendants infringed its patents for devices that are
used to control the position of a streamer as the boat tows the streamer.
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II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

A.

Territorial Language & 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)

A direct infringement claim under § 271(a) requires a showing “that
the infringing activity took place within the United States.”53 Furthermore,
§ 271(a) provides that “[w]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . infringes
the patent.”54 The language of the statute creates an interpretation problem.
What meaning should courts attach to the phrase “within the United
States?”
Commentators have argued that “the ultimate determination of what
constitutes an unauthorized activity ‘within the United States’ is a mixed
question of fact and law to be determined by the subject matter, in
particular the location and extent of the allegedly infringing activity and the
type of claims in the patent, on a case-by-case basis.”55 A case-by-case
analysis gives courts little guidance and this lack of guidance may explain
why some courts take the path of least resistance by falling back on the
traditional presumption against extraterritorial application. In lieu of a clear
Congressional statement regarding the application of the Patent Act to the
EEZ, clear judicial statements adhering to the presumption are beneficial to
potential and current parties in patent litigation.
An authoritative statement solves three problems: coordination,
expertise, and efficiency.56 Coordination problems result from moral
disagreement. If two parties have reasonable, yet incongruent approaches
to a problem “are free to act as they see fit, disaster will follow.”57 An
authoritative statement tells parties the ‘right’ way to act, thus unifying
conduct.58 Accordingly, authoritative statements “reduce individual
decision-making error through the authoritative decision-maker’s greater
moral and factual expertise.”59 Here, Congress, acting as an authoritative

53.

WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 869 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (S.D.
Tex. 2012).

54.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (listing the elements of a claim for direct
infringement).

55.

Kurt G. Hammerle & Theodore U. Ro, The Extra-Territorial Reach of U.S.
Patent Law on Space-Related Activities: Does the “International Shoe” Fit as We
Reach for the Stars?, 34 J. SPACE L. 241, 261 (2008).

56.

Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 14-15 (2001) (discussing what rules must be like to settle
disagreements and uncertainties over what is to be done).

57.

Id. at 14 (arguing that rules do their moral work by supplanting the unsettled
moral considerations with more determinate ones).

58.

Id. at 15 (“Lack of coordination and expertise threaten deterioration into a
Hobbesian nightmare despite the members’ general similarity of moral views and
their willingness to act on moral reasons”).

59.

Id.
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decision-maker, could amend the Patent Act to address the reach of the
Patent Act in the United States EEZ.
A clear signal from Congress would allow current and prospective
inventors designing products for EEZ use to plan for the litigation related
to their products. If Congress provides an authoritative statement explicitly
rejecting patent protection, then some prospective inventors will likely
choose not to invent. Conversely, if Congress provides an authoritative
statement granting patent protection in the EEZ, then some prospective
inventors will be encouraged to begin the inventive process and other
inventors will be encouraged to license their inventions or use their EEZrelated inventions.
From an efficiency perspective, the inventor’s individual decision to
invent or not is less important than the inventor’s certainty in making his
decision and the amount of resources he expends making his decision.60
Many commentators have noted the difficulty in ascertaining the optimal
level of patent protection,61 so the most pressing concern is Congress’
failure to make an authoritative statement on the issue. Barring a
Congressional authoritative statement, the policy discussion turns to
whether the judiciary should make the decision as to whether the Patent
Act applies to the EEZ. This Note posits that the judiciary has the
institutional competence to apply the Patent Act extraterritorially, but
should not do so due to the presumption against extraterritorial application.
For the reasons explained below, Congress should make an authoritative
statement amending the Patent Act to incorporate direct infringement
claims arising from activities within the EEZ.

B.

Defining “Extraterritorial”

Assuming that the EEZ is not “within the United States,” the definition
of “extraterritorial application” directs how Congressional acts should be
construed.62 One commentator has offered three possibilities for the
meaning of the presumption against extraterritoriality.63 The first
60.

Id. (noting that “authoritative settlement is efficient”).

61.

See Chisum, supra note 1, at 66 (arguing that the optimal level of protection must
balance the incentives to invent and disclose against the restraint on competition
that necessarily results from patent protection).

62.

William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 85, 88 (1998) (discussing the different interpretations of
what the presumption against extraterritoriality means and the evidence required
to rebut the presumption).

63.

Id. (stating that the three possibilities apply: (1) “only to conduct that occurs
within the United States”; (2) “only to conduct that causes effects within the
United States”; and (3) to conduct occurring within or having an effect within the
United States. Id. at 87-88 (“When both conduct and the effects of an activity
occur entirely within a single state, one may safely characterize the state’s
regulation of the activity as ‘territorial.’ When, on the other hand, the conduct, the
effects, or both occur outside of the regulating state, the regulation may be
characterized as ‘extraterritorial’ to at least some degree.”).
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possibility is that “acts of Congress should be presumed to apply only to
conduct that occurs within the United States unless a contrary intent
appears, regardless of whether that conduct causes effects within the
United States.”64 The second possibility is that “acts of Congress apply
only to conduct that causes effects within the United States, unless a
contrary intent appears, regardless of where that conduct occurs.”65 The
third possibility is that “acts of Congress apply to conduct occurring within
or having an effect within the United States, unless a contrary intent
appears.”66
Under the first approach, conduct in the EEZ would not be subject to
the presumption because the EEZ is not “within the United States.”67 Under
the last two approaches, development in the EEZ could feasibly have an
effect within the United States, even if the development causing those
effects occurs outside of the United States (in the EEZ). Economic
development in the EEZ surely has an effect on the U.S.-based inventors
and the economy as a whole.
Another commentator suggests that “courts should look to
multinational patent litigation as the default rule and only extend U.S.
patent law abroad as a last resort.”68 Although this approach might be
tenable when an infringing act occurs in part or in whole in a foreign
nation, an infringement claim arising from conduct in the United States
EEZ could not come under the jurisdiction of any nation other than the
United States.69 This observation describes a conceptual gap in § 271(a)
literature and jurisprudence, as most proposed approaches to extraterritorial
application begin with the assumption that the infringing conduct or
effects, in part or whole, occur within a foreign nation.

C.

The Presumption of Strict Territorialism

Near the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
applied the presumption of strict territorialism to limit the scope of federal
customs and piracy statutes.70 Justice Holmes famously described the
64.

Id. at 105 (discussing Justice Holmes’ opinion in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909)).

65.

Id. at 119 (discussing Judge Bork’s opinion in Zoelch v. Arthur Anderson & Co.
824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

66.

Id. at 88-89 (discussing Judge Mikva’s opinion in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

67.

Id. at 88.

68.

Kendra Robins, Note, Extraterritorial Patent Enforcement and Multinational
Patent Litigation: Proposed Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259,
1310 (2007) (arguing that United States courts should enforce parallel foreign
patents through multinational patent litigation before seeking to extend United
States patent law extraterritorially).

69.

See infra Part III(B).

70.

The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no nation can justly extend
beyond its own territories, except so far as it regards its own citizens. They can
have no force to control the sovereignty of rights of any other nation, within its
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presumption against extraterritoriality,71 stating that “the general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done,” and would lead in “case[s] of doubt, to a construction of any statute
as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”72 In 1987, the
Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations characterized Holmes’ statement
as “often-quoted, but not reflective of contemporary law.”73 In a 1991
decision, however, the Supreme Court deferred to the presumption against
extraterritorial application when it refused to apply Title VII to an
employment discrimination claim that arose from conduct occurring
abroad.74 The presumption appears to be alive and well.75

D.

Judicial Application of Strict Territorialism to Patent Law

The presumption against extraterritorial application of patent law can
be traced back to 1856, when the Supreme Court held in Brown v.
Duchesne that patent law was “not intended to operate beyond the limits of
the United States,” and the patent holder’s right to exclusive use did not
“extend beyond the limits to which the law itself is confined.”76 The Patent
Act of 1870 did not mention any rights for patent holders outside of the
United States, and it merely provided rights for patent holders “throughout

own jurisdiction. And, however general and comprehensive the phrases used in
our municipal laws may be, but they must always be restricted in construction, to
places and persons, upon whom the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction.”);
U.S v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 645 (1818) (“The crime of robbery committed by a
person who is not a citizen of the United States on the high seas, on board of a
ship belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign state, is not piracy under the
act, and is not punishable in the courts of the United States.”).
71.

See Dodge, supra note 63, at 85 (noting the frequency with which Justice
Holmes’ statement is invoked in the name of the presumption against
extraterritorial application).

72.

American Banana v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909) (applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the reach of antitrust law to activity
within the United States).

73.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415, Reporters’ Note 2
(1987) (discussing jurisdiction to regulate anti-competitive activities).

74.

See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil v. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. 244
(1991) (analyzing a plaintiff’s claim that his employment was terminated because
of his race, religion, and national origin).

75.

See Dodge, supra note 63, at 86 (arguing that acts of Congress should
presumptively apply only to conduct that causes effects within the United States
regardless of where that conduct occurs and the presumption should be deemed
rebutted when there is good reason to think Congress was focused on something
other than domestic conditions).

76.

Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 196 (1856) (analyzing an infringement claim
for a new and useful improvement in the constructing the gaff of sailing vessels).
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the United States and the Territories thereof.”77 In a 1915 decision, the
Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to extend the reach of the patent
laws beyond domestic boundaries, holding that “[t]he right conferred by a
patent under our law is confined to the United States and its territories, and
infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a
foreign country.”78 The presumption against extraterritorial application of
patent law was codified in § 271(a) of the 1952 Patent Act, which states
that “whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented
invention, within the United States . . . infringes the patent.”79
The expansion of business interests overseas in the post-World War II
period highlighted the deficiencies in a patent regime that governed only
domestic patent disputes.80 Indeed, the landmark case of Deepsouth
Packing v. Laitram arose soon thereafter, pushing Congress to amend the
Patent Act to shed clarity on the issue of extraterritorial application.
Laitram brought suit in federal district court against Deepsouth
Packing, alleging that Deepsouth Packing infringed its patented shrimp deveining device by selling the machinery in the United States and abroad.
The district court found for Laitram and issued an injunction prohibiting
Deepsouth Packing from selling the infringing shrimp de-veining device in
the United States and abroad.81 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Deepsouth
Packing exposed a loophole in § 271 by attempting to modify the
injunction so that it would be allowed to ship components of the infringing
device abroad, where the components would be assembled by foreign
customers.82 This clever approach exploited § 271(a)’s requirement that for
a finding of infringement, “the make, use or sale of an infringing device

77.

See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 333 (1948) (stating that
“‘[e]very patent shall contain a short title or description of the invention or
discovery, correctly indicating its nature and design, and a grant to the patentee,
his heirs of assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to
make, use and vend the said invention or discovery . . . throughout the United
States and the Territories thereof, referring to the specification for the particulars
thereof . . . .’”) (quoting Act of July 8, 1870, Ch. 230, 16. Stat., § 22, 198, 201
(1870).

78.

Dowagiac Mfg. v. Minnesota Moline Plow, 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (assessing
an infringement action regarding a patent for shoe drills, where the allegedly
infringing shoe drills were sold in Canada, but not the United States).

79.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The Patent Act of 1952 was codified
in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376, and has undergone multiple revisions.

80.

Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, Patent Law and Exported Software, 25 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON L. 557, 561 (2004) (discussing legislation and legal rulings that have
resulted in various interpretations of 35 U.S.C § 271(f)).

81.

Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037, 1066 (E.D. La.
1969) (holding that two of plaintiff’s claims for a shrimp de-veiner were infringed
by defendant’s device).

82.

Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 936 (5th Cir. 1971)
(analyzing and affirming the district court’s decision under the doctrine of
equivalents).
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must occur within the United States.”83 The Fifth Circuit recognized that
interpreting § 271 in Deepsouth Packing’s favor “would allow an infringer
to set up shop next door to a patent-protected inventor whose product
enjoys a substantial foreign market and deprive him of his valuable
business.”84 The Fifth Circuit’s ruling, however temporary, chipped away
at the traditional presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent law.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that “our patent
system makes no claim to extra-territorial effect” and § 271 “makes it clear
that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of
the United States.”85 In doing so, the Supreme Court put the ball in
Congress’s proverbial court, rejecting ambiguous statutory language as
grounds for expanding the reach of U.S. patent laws and requiring a clear
and certain signal from Congress to do so.86
In response to the concerns noted by the Fifth Circuit, Congress
enacted § 271(f), creating a cause of action for infringement when a party
exports components of a patented invention abroad with the intent to
induce combination of the components in an infringing manner abroad.87
83.

See Fisch, supra note 81, at 563 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision sided
with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits); see also Laitram Corp. v.
Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. 518, 524 n.5 (1972) (“Deepsouth is entirely
straightforward in indicating that its course of conduct is motivated by a desire to
avoid patent infringement. Its president wrote a Brazilian customer: ‘We are
handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This was a very
technical decision and we can manufacture the entire machine without any
complication in the United States, with the exception that there are two parts that
must not be assembled in the United States, but assembled after the machine
arrives in Brazil.’”).

84.

Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d. 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971)
(noting that the loophole in § 271(a) “would require us to countenance obvious
schemes, perhaps as simple as omitting an important screw, designed to evade the
mandate of § 271(a). No such magical significance should be accorded under §
271(a) to the place of ultimate mechanical assembly of a machine’s elements. We
hold that ‘makes’ means what it ordinarily connotes—the substantial manufacture
of the constituent parts of the machine.”).

85.

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (explaining
that to the extent the inventor needs patent protection in foreign markets, he must
seek protection abroad where those patents are used).

86.

See id. (“[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our
prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of
privilege is based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory
language. We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before
approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the
beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than the
courts had previously thought. No such signal legitimizes respondent’s position in
this litigation.”).

87.

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2006) (“Whoever without authority supplies or causes
to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in
whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
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Section 271(f) has an inherently extraterritorial character because the
infringing activity targeted by the statute actually occurs—at least in part—
outside of the United States.
In 1994, Congress amended § 271(a) and § 271(c)88 to create direct and
contributory infringement claims for “offers to sell” an invention within the
United States, in order to comply with the requirements of the newly
negotiated Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”).89 In Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling v. Maersk
Contractors (hereinafter “Transocean”), the court held that an offer to sell
is infringing if the offer’s contemplated sale would occur in the United
States, regardless of where the actual offer was made.90 Transocean was
components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an
infringer.” (emphasis added)); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2006) (“Whoever without
authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any
component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted
for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial non-infringing use, where such component is uncombined
in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and
intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the
United States, shall be liable as an infringer.” (emphasis added)).
88.

See § 271(c). This subsection of the infringement statute also has an
extraterritorial focus. (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).

89.

Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After Transocean, 61 EMORY
L. J. 1087, 1091 (2012); see also Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 23 HOUSE. J. INT’L
L. 169, 187-88 (2000) (“The TRIPS Agreement is divided into three main
sections—standards, enforcement, and dispute settlement . . . . The section on
minimum standards defines the subject matter to be protected, the intellectual
property rights conferred, and the minimum duration of protection . . . . The
national treatment provisions of the WIPO govern the TRIPS Agreement, where
“[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favorable than it accords to its own national with regard to the protection of
intellectual property. . . . The idea of national treatment flows into the concept of
most-favored nation (‘MFN’). Article 4 of Part I states “[w]ith regard to the
protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.”) (first
and second alterations in original).

90.

Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., v. Maersk Contractors, USA Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for an offer to sell to constitute
infringement, the offer must be to sell a patented invention within the United
States. The focus should not be on the location of the offer, but rather the location
of the future sale that would occur pursuant to that offer.”).
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significant because it was a judicial decision (not a Congressional
amendment) that created an infringement claim even when “no sale is ever
concluded in the United States, so long as negotiations contemplate a future
sale in the United States.”91 Although Transocean expanded extraterritorial
application of § 271, it was an expansion governing certain behavior (i.e.,
an offer to sell). By contrast, this Note proposes an expansion of
extraterritorial application of § 271 to a location; the United States EEZ.

E.

WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical

A prime example of judicial deference to Congress regarding § 271
was the district court’s decision in WesternGeco v. ION Geophysical, in
which WesternGeco alleged infringement of its patented marine seismic
streamer technology.92 Here, ION Geophysical applied for and received a
permit from the U.S. Department of the Interior to conduct a threedimensional marine seismic survey in the Chukchi Sea approximately 100
miles northwest of Wainwright, Alaska and 150 miles west of Barrow,
Alaska.93 The survey would cover ocean outside of the United States’
territorial sea, but within the boundaries of the United States EEZ.94
WesternGeco alleged that the defendants violated § 271 (a), (b), (c), and (f)
by “‘making, using, offering to sell, selling and/or supplying in or from the
United States products and services relating to steerable streamers and/or
inducing and/or contributing to such conduct.’”95 The defendants countered
that WesternGeco’s complaint failed to allege any action that could be an
infringement occurred or would occur within the United States.96 The court
analyzed WesternGeco’s infringement claims within the framework of the
traditional presumption against extraterritoriality, stating:
[A]s the EEZ is outside of the territorial United States, and Congress
has limited the reach of U.S. patent law to the United States and its
territories, infringing activity would not be actionable under U.S. patent
law. Even though U.S. jurisdiction has been extended to the EEZ for some,
but not all activities, this begs the question of whether it takes U.S. patent
91.

Holbrook, supra note 89, at 1092 (arguing that the Transocean court’s decision
regarding extraterritoriality fails to account for comity issues and conflicts of
law).

92.

WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d. 342, 347 (S.D.
Tex. 2011) (noting that WesternGeco’s patents claimed streamers that use
acoustic signals and sensors to create three-dimensional maps of the ocean floor,
which are used for natural resource exploration and management).

93.

Id. at 347-348.

94.

Id. at 354 (characterizing the issue as whether the seas located approximately 100
miles from shore can be considered “territory” of the United States for the
purposes of U.S. patent law).

95.

Id. at 348.

96.

Id. at 354 (noting that some of the defendants “argue that, because WesternGeco
has not shown and cannot show that an act will occur within the United States,
they are not subject to personal jurisdiction.”).
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law—which territorially limited—along with it. Congress could extend the
reach of U.S. patent law to encompass marine scientific research occurring
in the EEZ, as countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom have
done.97
The general holding of WesternGeco is that the U.S. EEZ is not
“within the United States” for purposes of direct infringement claims under
§ 271(a).98 The court held that Reagan’s proclamation “incorporates the
principle that the sovereign rights that the United States enjoys in its EEZ
and continental shelf are ‘functional in character, limited to specific
activities.’”99 This characterization supported a finding that the EEZ is not
“within the United States,” but the court continued its analysis, noting that
the exploration of “natural resources, both living and non-living, of the
seabed and subsoil” in the EEZ could be considered conduct subject to the
United States’ sovereign rights.100 The court extrapolated this proposition,
entertaining the possibility that “the United States possesses a subset of
resource-related sovereign rights over these activities in the EEZ and
possesses the power to enforce patent law within the territorial limits of its
sovereignty leads to the conclusion that U.S. patent law applies to natural
resource-related activity that occurs within the EEZ.”101 The court declined
to accept this argument, citing Reagan’s proclamation, customary
international law, and UNCLOS for the proposition that “a country’s EEZ
maintains its status as outside the territory of that country and largely
maintains its status as high seas.”102 The WesternGeco court seemingly
based its decision on the reasons mentioned above and the judiciary’s longstanding reluctance to extend the geographic scope of patent rights.103
97.

Id. at 370 (rejecting the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act as grounds for
establishing subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants).

98.

WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d. 342, 371 (S.D.
Tex. 2011).

99.

Id. at 368 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 511, cmt.
b (1987)).

100. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d. 342, 368 (S.D.
Tex. 2011) (discussing the EEZ as a United States territory).
101. Id. (noting that the United States does not possess full sovereign rights over the
EEZ, but merely a small set of rights related to economic exploration and
exploitation).
102. Id. (discussing the possibility that the Australian Patent statute cited by
WesternGeco could be interpreted to mean that Australia’s EEZ is not Australian
“territory”); see also United States v. Matute, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162919, at
*16 (S.D. Fl. Aug. 20, 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “Article 86
of UNCLOS extends Columbia’s sovereignty through the EEZ and therefore he
was not arrested in international waters (a/k/a/ the high seas).”).
103. See WesternGeco, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (discussing cases in which the Supreme
Court has not expanded the geographic scope of patent laws); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that Johns
Hopkins must rely on foreign patent protection to the extent that it complains
CellPro has damaged Johns Hopkins’ ability to service foreign markets).
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The “Area” outside of the EEZ is clearly high seas, but —as noted in §
I(B)—a coastal nation possesses sovereign rights in its EEZ greater than
those in its “Area,” in which it possesses none. To dismiss the EEZ as a
swath of ocean that “largely maintains its status as high seas” minimizes
the substantial sovereign rights that the United States has over the natural
resources in its EEZ—natural resources that United States businesses will
harvest with the help of patented device; like those at issue in
WesternGeco. The special rights afforded to the United States in its EEZ
warrant the protection of U.S. patent law.
In an August 16, 2011, opinion, the court addressed WesternGeco’s
motion for partial reconsideration regarding direct infringement in the
United States EEZ.104 WesternGeco argued that the court should allow
WesternGeco’s direct infringement claims under § 271(a) because the EEZ
is a “possession” of the United States,105 and “possession” is broader than
the term “territories” in 35 U.S.C § 100(c).106 Congress amended the
definition of the “United States,” by including the words “and possessions”
to its meaning, thus giving rise to WesternGeco’s argument that its direct
infringement claims should survive a motion to dismiss on the basis that
the EEZ is a possession of the United States.
In support of its argument that the EEZ is within the United States’
possession, WesternGeco cited Vermilya Brown Co. v. Connell,107
(hereinafter “Vermilya Brown”) wherein the Supreme Court held that
“possession” in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 means “areas beyond
U.S. territories so long as Congress can exercise control in them.”108 In
response, the WesternGeco court distinguished Vermilya Brown on a
narrow point because “it addresses whether the term ‘possession’ in the
104. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91326, at
*1-7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011) (“[W]e dismissed WesternGeco’s claims of direct
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) that was based upon Fugro Defendants’
acts located in or upon Statoil’s lease holdings in the Chukchi Sea. We found that
these activities would occur outside the United States and its territories, and thus
were not actionable under U.S. patent law. We granted WesternGeco leave to
amend its complaint and to add a request for declaratory judgment under 28
U.S.C. § 2201.”).
105. Id. at *5 (stating that “[s]ince the United States can control economic activity in
the EEZ, WesternGeco contends that the EEZ is a possession of the United
States.”).
106. Id. at *7 (citing 35 U.S.C § 100(c) and stating “The terms ‘United States’ and
‘this country’ mean the United States of America, its territories and
possessions.”).
107. Vermilya Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948) (holding that the
Bermuda leasehold was an area where the United States has “sole power” and
that Congress’s use of “possession” demonstrated an intention to have FLSA
apply to employer-employee relationships on foreign territory under lease for
bases).
108. WesternGeco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91326, at *16 (noting that WesternGeco’s
justification for finding that the EEZ is a possession of the United States is that
the United States can control economic activity in its EEZ).
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context of FLSA can refer to land leased by the United States, rather than
whether the term ‘possessions’ in the Patent Act can encompass ocean
areas that are the United States’ EEZ.”109 Thus, based on the ordinary
meaning of “possession,” the WesternGeco court held that the United
States neither “owns” nor “occupies” the EEZ, thus rendering the EEZ not
a United States “possession” for the purposes of § 271(a).110 This holding
seems to be a close call as the WesternGeco court recognized that “the
level of control the United States possesses in the EEZ is analogous to the
level of control that the United States possessed in the Bermuda leasehold
that was the subject of Vermilya Brown . . . .”111 Further, the court
recognized: “The United States’ control exists in the form of a bundle of
sovereign rights and jurisdiction related to the economic exploitation,
scientific exploration, and national resource development of natural
resources within the EEZ and the OCS.”112 The United States’ sovereign
rights in the EEZ are substantial, and the WesternGeco court’s discussion
of whether the EEZ is a United States territory or possession begs for a
Congressional authoritative statement either allowing or excluding direct
infringement claims under § 271(a) for infringing activities performed in
the United States EEZ.

III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Congress has the ability to regulate acts outside of the territorial limits
of the United States, especially with respect to United States citizens.113
However, courts have historically required a clear statement from Congress
that it intended to exercise Congressional authority.114 The Supreme Court
has even articulated a presumption against extraterritorial application of
109. Id. at *20 (discussing the shortcomings of applying Vermilya Brown to its case).
110. Id. at *21-22 (stating that “it is clear that the United States neither ‘owns’ nor
‘occupies’ the EEZ since it has been recognized that the EEZ is not the territory
of the United States and that other nations possess the traditional freedoms of the
high seas in the EEZ.”).
111. Id. at *23 (“In addition, we do not believe that a Congressional intent evinced in
the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 indicates that Congress believed
the term possessions to include areas of sea rather than areas of land.”).
112. Id. at *22 (discussing the United States’ control over the EEZ).
113. See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2129 (stating that “the use of a U.S. patent to
regulate behaviors in another country can run afoul of policy differences in the
affected country”); Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality
and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1235 (1992)
(discussing the due process limits of applying federal legislation
extraterritorially); but see A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal
Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 384 (1997)
(arguing that there are no limits on extra-territorial application of federal
legislation).
114. See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2129 (providing background relating to the
extraterritorial application of intellectual property laws).
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U.S. patent law. The major justifications for the presumption against
extraterritorial application are: Congressional intent, consistency with
international law, and consideration of the separation of powers.116

A.

Congressional Intent

Proponents of the presumption have argued that Congress has the
ability to specify the extraterritorial reach of its statutes and that, without
such guidance, the judiciary is unlikely to duplicate what Congress would
have done had it addressed the issue.117 While this may be true, it is unclear
why such judicial outcomes are undesirable.
Some commentators argue that as Congress has moved away from a
strict focus on domestic issues when crafting legislation, the justification
for a presumption against extraterritorial application has been weakened.118
The reasoning behind this analysis is that as Congress has become more
aware of the international implications of its legislation, it has grown more
likely to clearly express the extraterritorial limits of its statutes, defeating
the necessity of a presumption of extraterritoriality. Increased international
legislation, however, may actually increase,—rather than decrease, the
necessity of the presumption against extraterritoriality because the
presumption “encourages Congress to focus on and provide useful
guidance about extraterritoriality.”119
The WesternGeco court presumed that the law should not apply
extraterritorially without a clear statement from Congress. The policy
rationale behind requiring clear statements is that they “force Congress
expressly to deliberate on an issue and to unambiguously set forth its will .
. . .”120 Requiring clear statements from Congress is a sound approach to
extraterritorial application of United States law, but issues arise when

115. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007) (“The presumption
that United States law governs domestically, but does not rule the world applies
with particular force in patent law.”).
116. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 546 (1997) (arguing that the presumption
against extraterritoriality is supported by principles of separation of powers).
117. Id. at 554-55 (noting that there are a number of statutes that explicitly limit the
scope of extraterritorial application, rather than relying on effects-based tests that
courts have difficulty applying consistently).
118. Id. at 555 (“These provisions may also demonstrate, as some critics of the
presumption claim, that Congress today no longer regulates primarily with
domestic conditions in mind.”).
119. Id. (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality has the positive effect
of requiring Congress to focus on the political problems and uncertainties
proliferated by extraterritorial application).
120. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 458 (1989).
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Congress is slow to react to statutory loopholes exposed through
litigation.121

B.

Consistency with International Law & Conflicts of Law

Consistency with international law is another benefit of the
presumption, as numerous treaties regulating intellectual property are
available to resolve patent disputes abroad.122
In the context of
extraterritorial application of patent law in the United States EEZ, there
does not appear to be any potential conflict between the laws of foreign
nations. The WesternGeco court, however, noted that it is not clear whether
the United States would be the only nation with the authority to promulgate
patent law in the United States EEZ.123 The court noted that, based on the
facts of the case, “the United States[] EEZ in the Chukchi Sea does not
appear to be subject to other nations’ competing claims to an EEZ in that
same area,” but “this may not hold true for other parts of the United
States[] EEZ, which could be subject to competing claims by neighboring
nations.”124 It does not appear that conflicts with foreign law would ever be
at issue in the United States EEZ, so consistency with international law
should not be a factor in the policy debate regarding extraterritorial
application of the Patent Act to the EEZ.

C.

Institutional Competency

According to some proponents of the presumption, “extraterritorial
application of federal law raises difficult domestic and foreign policy
questions.”125 Factors worthy of consideration when deciding the efficacy
of extraterritorial application of a statute include the effect on United States
business interests and the potential for undermining relations with foreign

121. See Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 10, at 2127 (criticizing Congress’s
failure to quickly respond to perceived loopholes in the Patent Act, and arguing
that, as a result, the current state of law is ambiguous and rests on tenuous
theoretical grounds).
122. See Bradley, supra note 117, at 547 (discussing the various concerns promulgated
by the extraterritorial application of U.S. law and highlighting conflict of laws as
the most pressing of those concerns).
123. WesternGeco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91326, at *35 (stating that there are two
problems with the argument that the United States has sole authority of the EEZ).
124. Id. In this statement, the WesternGeco court seems to be alluding to potential
conflicts between the U.S. and neighboring nations regarding overlapping claims
for the scope of their respective EEZs. However, the potential for conflict is
negligible, as the U.S. claims a clearly delineated EEZ extending 200 nautical
miles from its coastal baselines, including its continental shelf extending beyond
200 nautical miles.
125. See Bradley, supra note 117, at 550 (arguing that separation of powers
considerations do not receive enough attention in the discourse concerning
extraterritoriality).
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governments. Proponents of the presumption argue that the judiciary
does not have sufficient “institutional competence” to deal with these
issues because it lacks information related to “foreign governments and
U.S. strategic and economic interests around the world.”127 Other
commentators, however, argue that “as Congress has increasingly regulated
foreign conduct, the courts have gained institutional competence with
respect to extraterritoriality.”128
The argument that the judiciary lacks institutional competence seems
to hold some weight when applied to federal law in general, but the
judiciary has demonstrated a high level of competence in patent law. In
1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
created under Article III of the Constitution.129 The Supreme Court has
since recognized the Federal Circuit’s “special expertise” in patent law.130
The Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction in special subject areas,
including international trade, patents, and trademarks, among others.131 In
fact, thirty-one percent of the cases adjudicated by the Federal Circuit
involve intellectual property issues, suggesting a high level of competence

126. Id. (arguing that negative effects on interstate commerce and foreign relations
create the basis for separation of powers concerns in the extraterritoriality
debate).
127. Id. (arguing that some characteristics of the judicial decision-making process
prevent the judiciary from responding to changing conditions in the relationships
between the U.S. and foreign governments).
128. Jonathon Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 237 (1983) (“Institutional legitimacy concerns stem from the
perceived practical or constitutional limitations of a court, neither basis is
particularly useful in supporting the presumption against extraterritoriality. Courts
are clearly capable of resolving extraterritorial questions. There is nothing
mysterious or especially complex about extraterritorial disputes: courts often deal
with jurisdictional conflicts in both domestic cases and cases involving expressly
extraterritorial statutes. Since these disputes affect private parties, the central
issues are primarily legal and not technical or political. There is, therefore, little
basis for an institutional competence rationale for the presumption.”).
129. Court Jurisdiction, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2014) (noting that the court was formed by merging the United State Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals with the appellate division of the United States
Court of Claims); see also Chisum, supra note 1, at 23 (explaining that the
Federal Circuit was created to achieve a “unified forum for patent appeals, with
the intent of strengthening the American patent system.”).
130. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 20 (1997).
131. Court Jurisdiction, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2014) (noting that patent claims reach the court on appeal from the federal
district courts).
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and sensitivity to the implications of its decisions regarding relations
between the United States and other nations.132
In Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, the Court
recognized that the judiciary must be careful not to overstep its
constitutional authority, reasoning that: “federal judges—who have no
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices by those
who do.”133 The decision-making power for resolving public interest issues
should lie with the political branches, not the judiciary.134 The Court’s
conclusion that Congress should control the entirety of the public discourse
seems to be an overly broad statement. Nevertheless, commentators have
argued, and this author agrees, that the executive and legislative branches
should take “on the lion’s share in determining when, and explaining why,
United States law should or should not be applied extraterritorially.”135

D.

The Patent Act Should Apply in the United States EEZ

Recently, courts have widened the breadth of subject matter that
qualifies for patent protection, including software, business methods, and
scientific discoveries.136 The current trend in patent protection certainly
seems to be toward expansion. Further, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission have found that intellectual property licensing
132. Id. (noting that administrative law cases and claims against the United States for
money damages, in addition to intellectual property cases, comprise the bulk of
the court’s docket).
133. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984) (holding that “[w]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s
policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by
Congress, the challenge must fail.”).
134. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (affirming the
lower court’s decision and holding that “in our constitutional system the
commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with ‘common sense
and the public weal.’” Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political
branches.”); see also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)
(“The conduct of foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—the ‘political’—departments of
the government . . . .”).
135. Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative
of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 310
(1996) (arguing that in the extraterritorial context, “the executive and legislative
branches must perform the same functions that they do in the domestic sphere
because extraterritorial application, by its nature, goes against the grain of
democratic governance.”).
136. See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2124; see also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (allowing for
patent protection on business methods); but see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963-64
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that a claim for a method of hedging risk in the field of
commodities trading failed to pass the machine-or-transformation test set).
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“allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is
generally pro-competitive.”137 The EEZ is ripe for development, and when
combined with the pro-competitive effects of the patent regime, offers the
potential for economic growth in the United States.

IV. CONGRESS OR THE COURTS: THE BEST VEHICLE FOR CHANGE
Although Congressional intent, consistency with international law, and
separation of powers considerations, taken together, generally provide
sufficient justification for the presumption against extraterritorial
application, the unique sovereign characteristics of the EEZ relieve some of
the concerns traditionally associated with extraterritorial application. On
the one hand, the judiciary, specifically the Federal Circuit, is wellequipped to perform a cost-benefit analysis of extraterritorial application
(including the possible implications of extraterritorial application on
foreign relations, which are not apparent). On the other hand, when
Congress passes legislation concerning international matters, it is not
always clear that Congress possesses the institutional capacity to make its
intent clear with regard to extraterritorial application.138 Nevertheless, the
presumption weighs in favor of requiring Congress to affect this Note’s
proposed amendment to the Patent Act.
Some commentators have argued that a consequence of extraterritorial
application is that “potential litigants are not put on adequate notice of
litigation,” which complicates business decisions and increase litigation.139
Congress, not a judiciary impeded by the presumption, should make an
authoritative statement to put to rest the confusion caused by the lack of an
effective patent regime in the EEZ. The current state of patent law in the
United States’ EEZ is a “no-man’s land,” where infringing activity could
spark litigation in other federal district courts that have thus far been silent
on the issue. As WesternGeco is the only reported decision that has
addressed whether the EEZ is “within the United States” for the purposes
of § 271(a), further litigation of the issue is likely. Business owners and
patent holders would benefit from receiving adequate notice of litigation by
an authoritative statement from Congress that § 271(a) should either apply
or not apply to infringing activities in the EEZ. Furthermore, this author
posits that Congress should explicitly extend the reach of § 271(a) because
of the economic benefits that would accrue to United States business
interests and inventors.

137. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE
AND
THE
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N
(Apr.
6,
1995),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm.
138. See Bradley, supra note 117, at 546 (attempting to add breadth to the literature
attacking the presumption against extraterritoriality).
139. Id. (arguing that extraterritoriality decisions, which would be fair if decided by a
legislative body, are subject to bias and unfairness when placed in the hands of
the judiciary).
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The simplest approach to dealing with the extraterritorial application of
the patent regime would be to strictly limit patent infringement to acts
committed within the United States; therefore, if any part of a patented
invention exists or is performed outside of the United States, then there
would be no infringement.140 This strict approach “would provide certainty
for patent holders and potential infringers, and allow them to make
informed decisions, thus providing for a more efficient patent regime.”141
Such a strict approach is flawed, however, when there is disagreement
about what constitutes territory “within the United States.” The United
States’ package of rights within the EEZ blurs the certainty that patent
holders and potential infringers would typically enjoy under such a strict
approach. The sovereign characteristics of the contiguous zone and the
EEZ, although diminished from the full sovereignty enjoyed by the United
States over its lands, support the position that Congress should bring the
entire EEZ, spanning 200 miles from the coastal baselines of the U.S.,
within the scope of the Patent Act.142 The courts are unlikely to interpret
either the contiguous zone or the EEZ to be “within the United States” for
the purposes of the Patent Act, as evidenced by the decisions in
WesternGeco.143 Congress is not bound by this language or the presumption
against extraterritorial application, and could thus recognize the difference
between purely international waters and the United States’ EEZ by
bringing the United States EEZ under the umbrella of the Patent Act.
In cases involving infringement in the EEZ, there is currently no patent
regime, whether domestic or foreign, that would provide relief for
infringement in the EEZ.144 As exploration of the EEZ increases, the need
for protection of patent rights in the EEZ will become increasingly
apparent. Perhaps an increase in patent claims arising from conduct in the
EEZ will provide the impetus for Congress to amend the Patent Act. If
140. See Holbrook, supra note 10, at 2129 (noting that this approach was once the
norm; the law was rarely applied extraterritorially).
141. Id. at 2189 (arguing that the courts would be able to adopt the author’s approach
over time, as they became more familiar and comfortable with interpreting the
laws of foreign countries).
142. See supra Part I(B).
143. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d. 342, 368 (S.D.
Tex. 2011); WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91326, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011).
144. Hence, the title of this Note: “The Exclusive Economic Zone: A ‘No-Man’s
Land’ For United States Patent Law.” The WesternGeco court, however, noted
that it is unclear whether the United States would be the only nation with the
authority to promulgate patent law in the U.S. EEZ. The court noted that, based
on the facts of the case, “the United States’ EEZ in the Chukchi Sea does not
appear to be subject to other nations’ competing claims to an EEZ in that same
area,” but “this may not hold true for other parts of the United States’ EEZ, which
could be subject to competing claims by neighboring nations.” WesternGeco
L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91326, at *35 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 15, 2011).
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Congress does not act quickly, significant judicial departures from the
presumption against extraterritorial application § 271 to the United States’
EEZ could occur.
A Congressional amendment of § 271(a) that brings the EEZ under the
umbrella of the Patent Act should be applied prospectively. Inventors and
businesses have most likely made investment decisions on the assumption
that no patent protection is available in the EEZ. Congress is the best
vehicle for change because full retroactive application of judicial decisions
remains the standard approach.145 If instead the judiciary spurned the
presumption to bring the EEZ under the protection of the Patent Act, then
innovators with sunken investments in developing technologies related to
the EEZ could receive a windfall. The primary deficiency of retroactive
application is that it “may attach legal consequences to decisions made by
private parties who did not anticipate these consequences at the time the
decision was made.”146 A judicial decision affecting the EEZ would give
“mini-monopolies” to innovators who sunk costs without any expectation
of such a reward. Conversely, patent protection might spur investment in
EEZ-related activities by parties that had previously decided against
investment in EEZ-related activities because of the void in patent
protection. The likely consequences of change affected by judiciary
suggests that a Congressional amendment to the Patent Act is a more
appropriate means for bringing the EEZ under the umbrella of the U.S.
patent regime. Congress could avoid the windfall problem associated with
retroactive application by applying the Patent Act prospectively.147
A Congressional amendment is a more palatable vehicle for change in
light of traditional judicial deference to Congress in cases involving
extraterritoriality. The WesternGeco court expressed this sentiment, noting
that “[w]ithout express statutory construction, courts are reluctant to extend
the geographic reach of a patent right.”148 An amendment to the Patent Act

145. Bradley S. Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial
Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 812 (2003) (noting that the primary
issue with retroactive application is that parties rely on the ‘old’ rule to their
detriment).
146. Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81,
81 (1997) (proposing a ‘new’ method for analyzing non-penal retroactivity).
147. Id. (“Retroactive application may also attach legal consequences to decisions
made by private parties who did not anticipate these consequences at the time the
decision was made.”).
148. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d. 342, 369 (S.D.
Tex. 2011); see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (declining to extend 35 U.S.C. § 283 to enjoin activities in a
foreign country that did not constitute infringement within the United States);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007) (reaffirming the
“presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the
world applies with particular force in patent law.”).

77

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014
The Exclusive Economic Zone
is good policy, and WesternGeco is likely to be the first of many signals to
prompt Congress to make a change.149

149. Susan Decker, Ion Slides after Losing $105.9 Million Verdict: Houston Mover,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Aug.
17,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-16/ion-told-to-pay-schlumbergerunit-105-dot-9-million-in-patent-case (noting that in August 2012, a jury awarded
WesternGeco $93.4 million for lost profits and a $12.5 million royalty).
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